Family involvement in publicly traded firms and firm performance: a meta-analysis by Memili, Esra et al.
Family involvement in publicly traded firms and firm performance: a meta-analysis 
By: Vas Taras, Esra Memili, Zhonghui Wang, Henrik Harms 
Taras, V., Memeli, E., Wang, Z., & Harms, H. (2018). Family Involvement in Publicly-Traded 
Firms and Firm Performance: A Meta-Analysis. Management Research Review, 41(2), 225-
251.doi: 10.1108/MRR-05-2017-0150 
Made available courtesy of Emerald Publishing Ltd.: http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/MRR-05-
2017-0150  
 
***© Emerald Publishing Ltd. Reprinted with permission. No further reproduction is 
authorized without written permission from Emerald Publishing Ltd. This version of the 
document is not the version of record. Figures and/or pictures may be missing from this 
format of the document. *** 
 
Abstract: 
 
Purpose: 
This study aims to investigate the effects of family involvement in corporations on firm 
performance. It remains unclear whether family-owned companies, or companies with other 
forms of family involvement in the corporate governance, perform better than firms with no 
family involvement. Furthermore, the study focuses on family involvement in publicly traded 
firms, which are different from private family firms. Hence, knowledge about family firms will 
be enriched through a closer look at the publicly traded family firms and shed further light onto 
the heterogeneity among family firms. 
 
Design/methodology/approach: 
The present study uses a meta-analysis of the extant research on family involvement and publicly 
traded family firm performance. The authors synthesize past research, identify and reconcile 
mixed findings and expand the understanding of the phenomenon. 
 
Findings: 
Involvement of the founding family members in firm governance tends to improve firm 
performance, albeit the effect is rather weak. However, the effect varies greatly depending on the 
type of family involvement and the measure of performance. The authors also identify regional 
differences, as well as variations by the firm size and study design. Furthermore, under-
researched areas are identified for future research. 
 
Practical implications: 
The results of the study would be useful in guiding organizational design and investment 
decisions. 
 
Originality/value: 
By using the meta-analytic approach, the present study provides a comprehensive review of the 
empirical evidence available on the issue so far. Most importantly, the authors were able to 
conduct a series of tests to assess the moderating effects of a number of factors that could not be 
evaluated in any individual study in the meta-analytic database. 
 
Keywords: Corporate governance | Family business | Strategic management | Organizational 
structure | Meta-analysis | Strategic management and leadership | Integrative review 
 
Article: 
 
1.Introduction 
 
Many corporations around the world involve a large shareholder group, typically founding 
families (Villalonga and Amit, 2006a, 2006b, 2009a, 2009b). Founders and/or family members 
are usually officers, directors or blockholders, either individually or as a group in those publicly 
traded firms (Villalonga and Amit, 2009a, 2009b). Family business research in general suggests 
that family involvement can lead to the pursuit of particularistic goals and strategies (Carney, 
2005). The behavior and performance of publicly traded family firms are expected to be distinct 
from those of non-family enterprises and other family firms (De Massis et al., 2012). Indeed, 
prior research has investigated whether family firms outperform their non-family counterparts 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003a) and explored the connections between founders and firm 
performance (Adams et al., 2009). A review of the literature suggests that generally, involvement 
of the founding family in firm governance improves performance, although the effect varies 
depending on the type of family involvement (Anderson and Reeb, 
2003a, 2003b, 2003c; Villalonga and Amit, 2006a, 2006b; Miller et al., 2007; Barontini and 
Caprio, 2006). In fact, studies show that different types of family involvement can affect firm 
performance positively or negatively or have no significant impact (O’Boyle et al., 2012; De 
Massis et al., 2012). For example, Berrone et al. (2010) showed a negative effect of family 
control on accounting performance, Filatotchev et al. (2005) reported a negative effect on firm 
valuation, and Anderson et al. (2009) found a negative effect on firm’s operational performance. 
 
It is largely because of these inconsistencies in findings that we set out to investigate the issue 
more comprehensively and explore whether the inconsistencies in findings are due to sample 
differences, study designs or other factors despite extensive extant studies (see De Massis et al., 
2012 for review of recent research). For example, firm performance is measured in various ways 
such as firm market valuation, firm accounting performance and firm operational performance. 
Hence, testing the effects of family involvement on firm performance across all these possible 
variations of the input and output variables is not feasible within the domain of a single study. 
Given the inherent differences between family and non-family firms and among family firms 
themselves, a thorough review of family involvement in publicly traded family firms can 
improve our understanding of governance dynamics in those companies, as well as their impact 
on the firm performance, which plays a major role in national economies. As family firms are 
key value creators around the globe (Gersick et al., 1997; Bertrand and Schoar, 2006; O’Boyle et 
al., 2012), reviewing the effects of family involvement on firm performance in corporations 
would help us also appreciate the research progress made to date and identify the areas deserving 
future research. This paper provides such a meta-analytic review and integration of studies 
investigating the link between family involvement and firm performance. 
 
The meta-analytic approach is uniquely suited to reconcile the inconsistencies of prior findings 
through a quantitative integration of the results of previous studies. It allows for: 
 
• calculating an overall effect; that is, consolidating available empirical evidence into a 
single quantitative effect size; and 
• testing the role of various contingency factors, such as differences in the sample, study 
design, measures or regions. 
 
Often, deviations in results of different studies can be explained by these external factors, and the 
meta-analytic approach enables us to show how the main effect tends to vary across different 
sample characteristics and how the results could be affected by various measurement and study 
design choices. Finally, a meta-analysis is still a research review. Not only does it help to 
integrate available empirical evidence but also detect under-researched areas pertaining to the 
issue at hand, as well as discover promising venues for future research. 
 
Hence, this meta-analytic review contributes to the literature in several ways. First, the study 
highlights the importance of different forms of family involvement in publicly traded companies 
to explain how families control corporations differently. By doing so, this review contributes to a 
better understanding of the differences between publicly traded family and non-family firms that 
are likely to have an impact on firm performance. Second, this review adds to the literature by 
reviewing different publicly traded family firm governance contexts and contingencies that can 
influence firm performance. By this, our understanding of the heterogeneity among family firms 
is improved (Melin and Nordqvist, 2007). Third, new insights and future research directions 
regarding corporate governance differences between family and non-family firms, as well as 
among family firms, are provided. Fourth, the meta-analysis allows for identifying and 
reconciling inconsistencies in the findings of past research that may stem from methodological or 
contextual differences. 
 
Our review paper progresses as follows. First, research with a focus on the link between family 
involvement and firm performance in publicly traded family firms is reviewed. To do so, the 
focus is on family involvement in publicly traded firms concerned with: 
 
• context moderators (i.e. institutional environment and firm size); 
• methodological moderators (i.e. operationalization of firm performance, family 
involvement measure, research design, such as family versus non-family firm comparison 
and heterogeneity among family firms, time period investigated and sample size); and 
• conceptual moderators (i.e. definition of family firms and theoretical background). 
 
By examining these issues, the review is better positioned to evaluate key findings and their 
theoretical and practical implications. This allows identification of several under-researched 
areas that require close scholarly attention. We examine the moderators by applying meta-
analytical techniques. In the final section of the review, we discuss our findings and provide 
promising future research directions and insights for practitioners. 
 
2.Literature review 
 
 
2.1Family involvement and firm performance in publicly traded firms 
 
Among corporations, family firms are different from non-family and other family firms by the 
level and type of influence they exert on firm behavior through ownership, management, board 
membership and the use of governance mechanisms Thus, our meta-analytical study is intended 
to examine moderator effects and the defining characteristics on the link between family 
involvement and firm performance (O’Boyle et al., 2012) and to consider the differences 
between private and publicly traded family firms (Chrisman et al., 2014). We are focusing on 
various forms of family involvement in publicly traded firms and its influence on firm 
performance. A special consideration is also given to the context, as well as methodological and 
conceptual moderators, that may be influential on this link. 
 
Family involvement in ownership, management and/or board can enhance firm performance, as 
the controlling family can provide superior oversight through lengthy tenure, invest in long-term 
projects or exhibit reputation concerns that diminish the possibility of questionable or 
irresponsible business practices (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; Dyer and Whetten, 2006). Indeed, 
family ties, loyalty and stability concerns tend to lengthen the horizons of family managers 
beyond their tenure and lifetime and provide incentives to make efficient investments in the firm, 
which can consequently maximize firm performance (James, 1999). As the family members’ 
business actions are closely linked to the welfare of the current and future generations, they are 
less likely to pursue personal interests over family considerations (James, 1999). In addition to 
the extended horizons rooted in the primary desire for the family’s continuity, unity and legacy 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2008), there is a close link between 
family’s wealth and company’s performance, particularly when family’s ownership of the 
business is relatively high (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a). The particularistic perceptions of co-
ownership, parsimony owing to family’s wealth at stake and the future generations in mind can 
lead to family business members’ current sacrifice for the long-run benefits for family by 
avoiding on-the-job consumption through lower dividends and profit sharing (James, 
1999; Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2005a, 2005b). This can facilitate family owner-managers’ 
efficient investment decisions (Carney, 2005). Accordingly, a prominent stream of research 
shows that family firms may outperform non-family firms (Hoy and Verser, 1994; Habbershon 
and Williams, 1999; Anderson and Reeb, 2003a; Lee, 2004, 2006; Andres, 2008). A recent 
comparative meta-analysis by O’Boyle et al. (2012) suggests that the link between family 
involvement and firm performance may be positive and stronger in publicly traded family firms 
than in their non-family counterparts. To ensure consistency and reliability of the findings, in our 
meta-analysis, we examine this link by only focusing on publicly traded family firms. Our 
sample is larger and includes more recent studies that specifically explored the effects of family 
involvement in publicly traded firms. 
 
Nevertheless, as O’Boyle et al. (2012) highlight, the link between family involvement and firm 
performance is likely to be affected by contingencies, such as firm size and culture. Moreover, 
whether it is the lone founder or the founding family as a whole that involves in managing the 
firm may also differentially impact firm performance (Miller et al., 2007; Adams et al., 2009). In 
our paper, we further expand the study of contingencies by examining context and 
methodological and conceptual moderators on the link between family involvement and firm 
performance. 
 
2.2Context moderators 
 
In our meta-analysis, we examine the moderation effects of institutional context and firm size. 
 
2.2.1Institutional context. 
 
A review by Gedajlovic et al. (2012) suggests that the effects of family firm governance on firm 
performance may depend on the existence of institutional forces. Indeed, institutional context 
(i.e. legal system, managerial labor market and takeover market) can shape family owners and 
managers’ power relative to non-controlling minority shareholders (Liu et al., 2012). For 
example, in the USA, family owners and managers may not have high levels of discretion power 
as peers in some other countries owing to effective investor protection. Accordingly, Peng and 
Jiang (2010) suggest that the impact of family ownership and family’s involvement in 
management and/or board on firm performance is associated with the level of shareholder 
protection embodied in legal and regulatory institutions of a country. When there is effective 
investor protection, family owners tend to dilute their equity to attract minority shareholders and 
delegate management to professional managers (Peng and Jiang, 2010). In this case, family 
owners and managers do not have the incentive to use control enhancing governance 
mechanisms that enhance their power. In contrast, when the legal system is weak, ownership 
becomes more concentrated by family owners who would seek to perpetuate their control by 
participating in management (Peng and Jiang, 2010). However, the downside of the enhanced 
power of the controlling family in an environment characterized by weak legal investor 
protection is the vulnerability to principal-principal agency problems, such as expropriation of 
non-controlling shareholder wealth and entrenchment of controlling family. 
 
Heugens et al. (2009) provide a meta-analytical review of studies focusing on the Asian region 
where they show a positive link between concentrated ownership, firm performance and 
moderation effects of institutions. The authors argue that strong legal protection of shareholders 
result in redundancy in concentrated ownership, whereas weak protection of shareholders leads 
to ownership concentration efficiencies as minority shareholders lack the incentive and mean to 
address managerial agency problems, if any. Hence, family firms can help to fill the void left by 
the underdeveloped institutional environment by providing financial, legal and governance 
protections (Liu et al., 2012). However, a certain threshold level of institutional development is 
necessary to make concentrated ownership effective (Heugens et al., 2009). Accordingly, in our 
meta-analysis, when we compare North America, South America, Europe and Asia, we expect 
that family involvement will have the most substantial impact on firm performance in relatively 
less developed institutional environments, such as Asian and South American regions, and less 
influence in more institutionally developed regions, such as Europe and North America. 
 
2.2.2Firm size. 
 
An important internal contingency on the link between family involvement and firm performance 
is firm size (O’Boyle et al., 2012). Maintaining family control may be of greater concern in 
small- and medium-sized organizations than in larger ones (Chrisman et al., 2014). Despite the 
common assumption regarding corporations as being large-sized enterprises, we expect firm size 
to vary among publicly traded family firms to some extent as well. Owing to the heterogeneity 
among family firms, and even more specifically among publicly traded family firms, size 
differences are likely to exist. When that is the case, we expect that family involvement will be 
more influential on firm performance in relatively smaller corporations owing to higher 
ownership stake rather than mainly a controlling interest and more discretion power by the 
family. 
 
Hence, in our meta-analysis, we examine whether family involvement is more influential on firm 
performance in less institutionalized context such as Asia and relatively smaller publicly traded 
firms. 
 
2.3Methodological moderators 
 
2.3.1Operationalization of family performance. 
 
Studies examine firm performance mainly from three perspectives, which are market valuation 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2004), accounting performance (Miller et al., 2013) and operational 
performance (McConaughy et al., 1998). The most commonly used market-based measure in 
research on corporation is Tobin’s Q (Chung and Pruitt, 1994) (Anderson and Reeb, 
2004; Villalonga and Amit, 2006a, 2006b, 2009b; Miller et al., 2007). This measure has the 
advantage of incorporating current operations, potential growth opportunities and future 
operating performance (Anderson and Reeb, 2004). Hence, it reflects both current and 
anticipated profitability. Additionally, this market-based measure of firm performance is 
reflective of shareholder wealth creation, which suits the main concerns of studies of 
corporations. Firm accounting performance, concerning profitability is measured via return on 
assets (ROA = net income/average total assets), return on equity (ROE = net 
income/shareholders’ equity) and return on investment (ROI = net income/total assets) (Carton 
and Hofer, 2006). Operational firm performance is measured in the forms of sales growth, 
income growth, R&D to sales ratio and capital expenditure to sales ratio. 
 
We expect that the type of firm performance measure will also be influential on the link between 
family involvement and firm performance as families may be more concerned with and effective 
in certain outcomes compared to others. For example, families with long-term orientation and 
future generations in mind tend to be more concerned with patient investments (Astrachan et al., 
2003; Zahra, 2005; Zellweger, 2007), and in turn, these families may focus on returns on assets 
than market-based valuation such as stock performance. 
 
2.3.2Family involvement measures. 
 
Some studies measure family involvement as a dummy variable where 1 indicates the existence 
of family involvement and 0 indicates otherwise. This is a simplistic and limited way of 
measuring family involvement as the composition of the family involvement in publicly traded 
firms tends to be more complex than in widely owned non-family firms because of the 
ownership concentration by the controlling family and ownership by minority shareholders. 
Additionally, heterogeneity of distribution of shares across members of an extended kinship 
group can increase the complexity. Family ownership in publicly traded firms tends to be 
universally common, despite legal restrictions on high levels of ownership within the domain of 
some nations’ legal systems (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Villalonga and 
Amit, 2009a, 2009b). On the one hand, family owners around the world can often hold relatively 
high percentages of ownership (Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998). On the other hand, in the USA 
and UK, shares in most large firms are relatively more diffused such that even the largest 
shareholder possesses a modest stake in the company rather than a large block. Moreover, US 
and UK courts hold the legitimate power and authority to intervene to ensure that shareholdings 
are dispersed (Morck and Steier, 2005). Furthermore, at least in the USA, minority shareholders 
tend to be the most litigious with the support of a well-developed corporate takeover mechanism, 
which can discipline or even remove ineffective corporate insiders, including relatively larger 
shareholders (Morck and Steier, 2005). 
 
Per Schulze and Gedajlovic (2010), studies have not always distinguished between the different 
effects of family ownership and family management and/or board membership. On the one hand, 
family owners may desire to govern their firms in certain idiosyncratic ways. On the other hand, 
family’s involvement in management and/or board can facilitate family’s governing their firms 
in the ways they desire. Family involvement in management and/or board can legitimize family’s 
authority and empower family members to take actions benefiting the family. When more family 
members are involved in management and the board, the resistance of non-family managers or 
non-controlling owners to controlling family’s decisions and actions will be less effective. 
Hence, family owners and management’s goals are expected be aligned (Chrisman et al., 2012). 
This can enhance the owners’ ability to protect their voting rights and controlling status and limit 
non-controlling owners’ rights through the adoption and use of governance provisions serving 
these purposes if they want to. Without active participation in management and/or board, 
family’s influence over the corporation may not be as substantial. Hence, family management 
and/or board membership will strengthen the effects of family on firm performance. 
 
In some cases, family’s management and/or board may not always accompany family ownership. 
Indeed, some family owners may not be willing or able to be involved in management and prefer 
to play the investor role. However, it is uncommon for families to be solely involved in 
management without any ownership. Therefore, in our meta-analysis, family management and/or 
board is distinguished from family ownership and investigated as a family involvement type 
contingency in the relationship between family involvement and firm performance owing to its 
strengthening family’s ability and willingness to be influential on the firm. 
 
Furthermore, findings are mixed concerning the performance differences between family firms 
controlled by different generations. Research shows that founder-controlled firms can 
outperform not only non-family firms but also descendant-controlled family firms (Barontini and 
Caprio, 2006; Lee, 2006; Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2006; Villalonga and Amit, 2006a, 
2006b; Andres, 2008). Some scholars argue the opposite by showing that descendant-controlled 
firms are more efficient and profitable than founder-controlled firms (McConaughy et al., 
1998; McConaughy and Phillips, 1999). According to Sraer and Thesmar (2007), family firms 
largely outperform non-family firms regardless of being controlled by the founding or 
descendant families, whereas Miller et al. (2007) show that only businesses with a lone founder, 
rather than a founding family, outperform others. Miller and Le Breton-Miller (2006) point out 
that family-controlled businesses perform well when they mitigate agency costs and foster 
stewardship behaviors among leaders. We expect that generational differences would be an 
important contingency on the link between family involvement and firm performance in our 
meta-analysis. 
 
Families in the USA are also able to sustain or strengthen their control by using control-
enhancing corporate governance mechanisms, which protect controlling shareholders (e.g. by 
creating excess voting rights over their cash flow rights) and managers (Villalonga and 
Amit, 2006a, 2006b; Memili, 2011; Memili et al., 2012). The use of control enhancing corporate 
governance mechanisms may be one key factor to understand the differences between publicly 
traded family and non-family firms and among family firms themselves as this may frame 
opportunistic actions of owners and/or managers as legitimate and result in idiosyncratic agency 
relationships and associated problems. Control-enhancing governance mechanisms, such as 
unequal voting rights in favor of the controlling family, can strengthen the family’s ability to 
pursue economic and non-economic goals primarily benefiting family members, rather than 
increasing shareholder wealth. Accordingly, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) show that 
control-enhancing governance provisions used in the USA can lead to higher agency costs, if 
managers use them to resist different types of shareholder activism, e.g. geared toward directing 
executives and directors to manage the firm in line with shareholders’ long-term interests 
(Daily et al., 2003). Gompers et al. (2003) also suggest that such mechanisms may be associated 
with performance differences among firms; however, they do not differentiate between family 
and non-family firms. 
 
Villalonga and Amit (2009a) highlight the importance of the use of control-enhancing 
governance mechanisms in corporations and find that the impact of control-enhancing 
mechanisms on firm performance depends on the mechanism used. Some family business studies 
focus on a few of the control-enhancing mechanisms such as voting agreements, dual-class 
stock, cross-holdings, pyramids[1] and their impact on firm performance have been studied 
within the framework of publicly traded family firms (Villalonga and Amit, 2006a, 2006b). 
These control enhancing mechanisms generally increase voting rights of the families relative to 
their share ownership (Villalonga and Amit, 2006a). With more voting rights, controlling 
families can decide “what businesses to enter and exit, what companies to acquire, what assets to 
sell, how much to invest, what officers and directors to select, how much to pay them, and how 
much money (if any) to distribute themselves and minority shareholders”, whereas non-
controlling owners’ rights are “to participate in dividend or other cash-flow distributions (that 
controlling owners decide on), and to benefit from capital gains (if there are any, and if the 
shares can be freely sold so that minority shareholders indeed realize those gains)” (Villalonga 
and Amit, 2009b, pp. 1-2). The controlling family may pursue family-centered targets and 
strategies to achieve those goals, which may consequently be beneficial to the controlling family 
but not to the non-controlling owners and the firm in general and thus can harm firm 
performance. Family firms are likely to exhibit unique corporate governance characteristics 
owing to the existence of controlling families and non-controlling owners with different 
interests. 
 
Memili (2011) and Memili et al. (2012) examine the impact of family ownership and family’s 
involvement in management and/or board on the use of corporate governance provisions and the 
interaction effects of family involvement components (i.e. family ownership and family’s 
involvement in management and/or board) and corporate governance provisions on firm 
performance in the USA. Still, studies investigating other control-enhancing governance 
mechanisms used in different countries are also needed to better understand corporate 
governance, to distinguish between publicly traded family and non-family firms and to 
appreciate the heterogeneity among family firms. 
 
2.4Research design 
 
Another contingency is the research design with regard to the composition of the sample. 
Thereby, we identify studies comparing family and non-family firms and those which focus on 
family firms only to take a closer look at the heterogeneity among family firms. The majority of 
articles we examine are in the family versus non-family firm comparison category. In cases in 
which more than one sample has been applied by the authors, we resort to the sample used for 
the main analysis and not to those applied in sub-analyses or robustness checks. We expect that 
both research designs would be equally influential on the link between family involvement and 
firm performance. 
 
2.5Time period investigated 
 
The findings may vary in different time periods, such as 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, owing to the 
changes in the legal systems across countries. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, also known 
as Investor Protection Act, became effective in the USA in 2002 as a reaction to corporate 
accounting scandals. This act enhanced the reliability of financial reporting, transparency and 
accountability through increased internal controls and auditing (Coates, 2007). Hence, we expect 
changes in the impact of family involvement on firm performance owing to changes in the 
nations’ legislative systems in different time periods investigated in research such that families 
may be more influential on firm performance in earlier time periods. 
 
2.6Sample size 
 
Finally, we expect that sample size in studies will play a role in the link between family 
involvement and firm performance. As small samples can produce large correlation coefficients, 
which may be statistically insignificant, and the opposite (i.e. smaller, but statistically significant 
coefficients) tends to occur in large samples, we expect that the influence of family involvement 
on firm performance will be more substantial in relatively smaller samples. 
 
2.7Conceptual moderators 
 
2.7.1Definition of family firms. 
 
As the findings on performance in previous studies might be affected by the composition of the 
sample, the applied family firm definition has been regarded as moderator. Being aware that 
some other options exist to systemize family business definitions, we use six different clusters 
adopted from a current study by Harms (2014) to account for outcome differences which can be 
traced back to definitional issues. These clusters are targeted to reveal the main trends in family 
business research and have been developed by focusing on the most frequently used definitions 
in previous research. 
 
Thereby, components of involvement and essence approaches have been grouped together, as 
this categorization by Chua et al. (1999) suggests that components factors, such as ownership or 
control, have to be combined with elements depicting the essence of family businesses, such as 
visions and intentions. Studies based on Chua et al.(1999) and more recent updates (Chrisman et 
al., 2005) systematically differentiate between family and non-family firms, as well as among 
family businesses themselves, bearing in mind that components and essence factors are jointly 
crucial to account for family firms’ uniqueness. 
 
Definitions with empirical focus are explicitly geared toward conducting empirical analyses. 
First introduced by Anderson and Reeb (2003a) and extended by Villalonga and Amit (2006b), 
this definitional approach specifies operational criteria to empirically measure family business 
characteristics, especially those with effects on the relationship between family ownership and 
firm performance. 
 
Definitions applied before the publication of the aforementioned definitional concepts and those 
intended to account to specific research designs are summarized under other definitions. Self-
developed definitions categorize studies in which the authors neglect previous definitions and 
base their studies on new sub-classification and self-developed approaches. In contrast to those 
assigned to the other clusters, studies without explicit definition do not refer to any family firm 
definition or solely point to the used data source without defining the object of investigation. 
 
Furthermore, Harms (2014) assigns some studies to the cluster F-PEC or familiness which 
contains all studies targeted at discussing “soft factors”, such as family’s values or commitment 
to the business. These definitions partly build on the components of involvement or essence 
approach but highlight the importance of experience and culture to explain family firms’ 
distinctiveness. However, none of the articles in our review builds on this cluster. 
 
In general, we expect no significant differences in results with respect to the family firm 
definition applied. However, some deviations might exist in studies in which no explicit 
definition or self-developed definitions are used to demarcate family from non-family firms. 
Owing to the missing information about the family firm definition in those studies, we are not 
able to predict in which direction family involvement might drive firm performance. 
 
2.7.2Theoretical background. 
 
Studies on publicly traded family firms mostly draw upon agency theory, suggesting that the 
equity level of the controlling family can influence the conflicts between family and non-family 
shareholders (Gilson and Gordon, 2003; Villalonga and Amit, 2006b). For example, in large US 
corporations, founding families appear to be the only blockholders whose control rights on 
average exceed their cash-flow rights (Villalonga and Amit, 2009b). The discrepancy between 
family’s control rights and ownership can exacerbate the agency problem of the expropriation of 
non-controlling owners, as families bear only a fraction of the costs associated with the private 
benefits they reap (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Claessens et al., 2002; Miller and Le Breton-
Miller, 2006; Villalonga and Amit, 2006a). Hence, principal-principal agency problems arising 
between controlling and non-controlling shareholders can sometimes be more severe than the 
principal-agent agency problems in publicly traded family firms (Ali et al., 2007). However, 
according to Gilson and Gordon (2003), non-controlling shareholders will continue to prefer the 
presence of a controlling shareholder so long as the benefits from reduction in principal-agent 
agency costs are greater than the costs of private benefits of control. Interestingly, the authors 
also suggest that some private benefits of control may be even necessary to encourage a party or 
a group to be the controlling shareholder, owing to the costs associated with holding a 
concentrated position and with monitoring, whereas a non-monitoring shareholder often enjoys 
the full benefits of the monitoring provided by a controlling shareholder without incurring any 
monitoring cost (Ang et al., 2000). 
 
While agency theory (versus stewardship theory) with a focus on principal-principal agency 
problems is the predominantly chosen theoretical framework for studies about publicly traded 
family firms, organizational theory provides the basis for one study (i.e. McGuire et al., 2012) in 
our meta-analysis. Few studies (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2011) apply other theories, and some 
studies (Miller et al., 2007; Peng and Jiang, 2010) in this meta-analysis applied more than one 
theoretical domain. To account for this and the potential effects on family involvement and firm 
performance, the respective articles have been summarized in the category multiple theories. 
 
Hence, in the following section, we apply meta-analytical techniques to examine how family 
involvement is influential on firm performance depending on methodological and conceptual 
moderators. 
 
3.Method 
 
To test the impact of family involvement on firm performance in publicly traded firms and to 
assess the importance of contextual and methodological moderators in past studies, we 
conducted a meta-analysis of extant empirical evidence available in the public domain. Meta-
analysis is ideal to quantitatively summarize and integrate the results of multiple primary studies 
(Lipsey and Wilson, 2000; Arthur et al., 2011; Hunter and Schmidt, 2004). The advantages of 
meta-analysis include the ability to quantitatively integrate large bodies of literature, examine 
relationships that are not investigated in the original primary studies, correct for study artifacts, 
test the effects of various moderators and mediators and uncover subtle trends that may be 
obscured in other approaches to summarizing research findings (Lipsey and Wilson, 
2000; Arthur et al., 2011; Hunter and Schmidt, 2004). 
 
3.1Search for relevant studies and study inclusion criteria 
 
To identify relevant studies, we used both electronic and manual searches of scholarly 
publication databases (Arthur et al., 2011; Cooper, 2014). The sample is limited to publication of 
a particular type, i.e. peer-reviewed journal articles, and excludes dissertations, conference 
presentations and unpublished studies. 
 
Studies that involve a measurement or estimate of family involvement in ownership, 
management and/or board in publicly traded firms are included in our meta-analytic database. 
Special attention was given to publications that also provide estimates of the relationship 
between family involvement in several domains of firm operations and various indicators of firm 
performance (King et al., 2004). 
 
We began with an electronic search through academic databases such as Google Scholar, 
ProQuest, EBSCO Host, Academic OneFile, JSTOR and Web of Science. Information from 
publications that met our selection criteria were coded and recorded in the meta-analytic 
database. Next, we manually reviewed the reference sections of all studies coded in the initial 
round to find additional work on the phenomena that we are investigating. Finally, we used 
Google Scholar’s “cited by” function to identify papers that cited the studies already in our meta-
analytic database and checked if any of them contain data suitable for the present meta-analysis. 
 
The following two main criteria were used to guide our inclusion/exclusion decisions: 
 
1. The study must empirically assess the relationship between (a) family involvement and 
(b) firm performance in publicly traded family firms only (not privately held). 
2. A quantitative index of the association between (a) and (b) must be provided in the paper 
(a correlation coefficient, t, F, d, χ2 or other association estimate). 
 
Our initial pool of studies that directly or indirectly explored the relationship between family 
ownership and firm performance was around 150. Applying these criteria reduced the number of 
articles that fit our selection criteria to 33. Please note, however, studies that satisfied criterion 
(1), but not criterion (2) were also included in the database. Using the vote count method, as 
applied in earlier meta-analyses (Taras et al., 2010; Merkin et al., 2014), we recorded the results 
of the articles in terms of their general conclusion on the nature of the relationship between 
family involvement and firm performance. That is, the results were simply recorded as 
“significant positive relationship”, “non-significant relationship” or “significant negative 
relationship”. While studies of this kind do not allow for a precise estimate of the effect size, 
they still provide useful information as they indicate the direction and significance of the 
relationship. Typically, studies that simply discussed the conclusion but provided no quantitative 
estimates of the relationship or studies that only reported the results of multivariate regression 
were included in the vote count category, as they allow for deriving the overall conclusion, but 
not for a correlation-like estimate of the direct impartial relationship between the two variables. 
 
All studies were initially coded by one of the co-authors of the paper. The coding was later 
independently checked by at least one other co-author. The inter-rater reliability was very high, 
exceeding 0.90 for every variable (Orwin, 1994; Stahl and Voigt, 2008). In the few cases when 
there were discrepancies in the coding, the co-authors reviewed the original publications to reach 
a consensus and corrected the data, if needed. Unclear cases and disagreements were resolved 
through discussions between the raters. After all inconsistencies were resolved, all coders were 
in an agreement that the coding was accurate. 
 
Following prior meta-analytic studies in the management literature (King et al., 2004; Crook et 
al., 2013), we applied the Hunter and Schmidt (2004) meta-analysis procedures. The effect size, 
i.e. the strength of the relationships between the variables of interest, was estimated using 
correlation coefficients reported in the coded studies (Aguinis et al., 2011; Crook et al., 2013). 
Correction for measure unreliability, i.e. attenuation, was used to estimate the effect sizes more 
precisely (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004). 
 
3.2Measures 
 
The focus of the present meta-analysis is on empirical studies that tested the relationships 
between the impact of a family on a publicly traded firm and performance of the firm. 
 
3.2.1Predictor variables. 
 
Upon reviewing the studies that we investigate in this paper, we find that the impact of a family 
on a public-traded firm is mainly manifested in the following aspects: 
 
1. family ownership; 
2. the degree of family involvement in management and/or board; 
3. whether the firms studies are considered/identified as a family firm; 
4. the generational differences; and 
5. governance provisions used. 
 
Correspondingly, we adopt family ownership as an umbrella term to summarize existing studies, 
which utilize the similar measures to represent the impact of family ownership. Family 
involvement in management and/or board categorizes existing studies, which investigate 
independent variables that represent the participation of family in management and/or 
board. Family firm dummy is a dummy variable indicating that the company is identified as a 
family firm by the study included in our sample. Family generational impact summarizes 
existing independent variables that differentiate the influences of founders or first-generation 
family owners with those of the second-generation family owners or later-generation family 
owners. Governance mechanism includes a variety of measures which represent the firm’s 
corporate governance provision choices. If a measure cannot be summarized into these 
categories, we label it as Other predictor. 
 
Because of inconsistencies in terminology, it was not always possible to rely on the variable 
labels to determine if the study meets our selection criteria. Accordingly, we reviewed the 
specific measures in each of the studies pre-selected for inclusion in the meta-analytic sample[2]. 
 
3.2.2Outcome variables. 
 
Across studies, firm performance is operationalized in a variety of ways. Accordingly, we used 
several coding categories to record our outcome variable, including the following: 
 
• firm market valuation, which includes, among others, stock performance and Tobin’s Q; 
• firm accounting performance, which includes measures of accounting performance such 
as ROA, ROE and operating return on asset (OROA); and 
• firm operational performance, which encompasses measures of firm operational 
performance such as sales growth, income growth, R&D/sales and capital expenditure to 
sales ratio. 
 
In cases when the firm performance indicators did not fall into any of the categories listed above, 
the type of outcome was coded as Other. 
 
3.2.3Moderators. 
 
To examine how the moderators affect the link between family involvement and firm 
performance, we additionally recorded such characteristics. Hence, in our meta-analysis, we 
investigate the following moderators. 
 
We examine the region as institutional context to determine whether the link between family 
involvement and firm performance varies across different parts of the world. The available data 
did not allow for a fine-grained analysis at the country level, but we had enough data to conduct 
the comparative analysis across the different continents, such as Asia, South America, North 
America and Europe. In a few cases, when samples included companies from multiple 
continents, they were coded as Mixed. 
 
Unlike the common assumption that corporations are all large firms and owing to the possible 
size differences even among corporations, we explore if firm size has a moderating effect on the 
relationship between family involvement and firm performance. We used the sample description 
information to classify our samples in the following categories: small, medium and large firms. 
Unfortunately, most studies did not provide consistent indicators of the firm size, such as the 
employee number or revenues, so we had to rely on how the firms in each sample were referred 
to in terms of their size. Typically, the large label was reserved for Fortune 500 or similar 
companies, medium for smaller national firms and small for small regional firms. 
 
The study design in our meta-analytic database relied on two basic approaches to study the effect 
of family involvement: one group of the studies used a comparison of family business versus 
non-family business approach, where performance of family businesses was compared to 
performance of non-family enterprises. The other group of the studies used a degree or 
heterogeneity analysis approach, where all firms in the sample were family businesses, but the 
degree of the family involvement varied. 
 
We also recorded the year (s) when the data were collected for each study. This allowed us to 
examine if effect of family involvement on firm performance has been changing over time. 
Furthermore, we also recorded the sample size in each study not only to weigh the results by the 
sample size as it is common in meta-analyses but also to test if the studies with larger sample 
sizes reported different effects from those with smaller sample sizes. While this would be purely 
a statistical artifact, if systemic differences were confirmed, it could help us reconcile 
inconsistencies in the findings of different studies. 
 
The definition of family business also varies among studies. To systematically differentiate 
between family and non-family firms and among family businesses themselves, we account for 
components and essence factors, which explain family firms’ uniqueness to a large extent, as 
well as for operational criteria, suited to empirically measure family business characteristics, in 
the study design. Thus, family businesses definitions might drive not only the research design but 
also the relationship between family involvement and firm performance. 
 
Furthermore, we examine the theoretical backgrounds on which the reviewed articles are based 
to identify potential influences which might be traced back to theoretical assumptions in the 
studies’ frameworks. 
 
3.4Measure commensurability 
 
A common challenge in meta-analyses is that the summarized studies rarely utilize identical 
research design and methodology. Minor differences, such as the difference between ROA and 
OROA, are not likely to lead to a substantial alteration of a construct. If the meta-analytic study 
is concerned with correlations, as it is the case in the present study, the scale has no or negligible 
effects on the correlation coefficient. If needed, the variables can be rescaled. However, if the 
studies are substantively different, aggregation becomes questionable (Sharpe, 1997). In some 
cases, the decision as to what category a particular variable of a study falls into our 
categorization was not clear-cut. In those cases, we used other information provided in each 
manuscript and our own judgment to code variables. 
 
Please note that the key piece of information recorded for each study was the correlation between 
family involvement and firm performance. A few publications provided no correlation 
coefficients and instead described the degree of association by using a different type of effect 
size, such as d-score, F-score or t-score. In those cases, the statistics were converted to the 
correlation coefficients by using standard conversion formulas (Cooper and Hedges, 
1994; Hunter and Schmidt, 2004). 
 
Finally, the sample size and reliabilities of the instruments were recorded. For studies that used 
objective measures, such as company profitability or market share, we assumed that data were 
nearly perfectly reliable. Recognizing, however, that even such precise records cannot be 
perfectly reliable, we used a coefficient of 0.95 for the data reliability. This approach allowed us 
to be more conservative and probably more precise in estimating the effect sizes in the 
population, as it is unlikely that any of the measures were perfectly reliable. Following 
procedures described by Hunter and Schmidt (2004), sample size and reliability statistics enabled 
us to provide meta-analytic indices that represent estimated population averages that were 
derived by aggregating individual correlation coefficients with corrections for measurement 
unreliability and weightings by the sample size (i.e. rho). 
 
Generally, any association measure can be converted to any other association measure to achieve 
consistency across the effect sizes included in a meta-analysis. However, there are notable 
restrictions. First, when the only type of results that are reported in the paper are those from a 
regression analysis, it is impossible to parcel out the relationship between the dependent variable 
and one particular independent variable from a longer list of independent variables. The 
regression beta coefficients are effectively partial correlations, and the binary correlation cannot 
be reconstructed from a regression result table. 
 
Likewise, some types of t-test results cannot be converted to a correlation coefficient. That is, 
while t-test statistics can normally be converted to any other association coefficient including 
correlations, t-statistics obtained based on a two-sample mean comparison cannot be 
meaningfully converted to correlation coefficients if both target variables are continuous. That is, 
if the subjects in two samples differ along a dichotomous characteristic (e.g. family versus non-
family firms) and the t-score was provided for another characteristic that presumably 
differentiates the samples (e.g. market share below and above a certain cut-off point), then the t-
score could be converted to a correlation coefficient representing the degree of association 
between the two target variables. However, if both variables are continuous (e.g. number of 
family members on the board of directors and market share), in some cases, such conversions are 
impossible. 
 
Furthermore, some studies in our sample that were based on sample mean comparisons (e.g. 
using t-test) simply reported the sample means and a note that the sample mean differences were 
statistically significant at, for example, p < 0.05 level. A conversion of the t-score to r-statistics 
requires that either the exact t-values or p-values are provided. In such cases, obtaining the exact 
correlation estimate of the relationship between family involvement and firm performance is 
impossible. All we can learn from these studies is the direction of the relationship and whether 
the relationship is statistically significant (for details, see Cooper and Hedges, 1994; Hunter and 
Schmidt, 2004). 
 
Nevertheless, results of these studies provide valuable information for a secondary verification of 
results. We included results reported in studies of this type in this meta-analysis by using a vote 
count approach, successfully applied in other meta-analytic studies (Bushman, 1994; Taras et al., 
2010). Specifically, results of these studies were classified into one of the following three 
categories: 
 
1. showed a significant positive relationship; 
2. showed a significant negative relationship; and 
3. showed no significant relationship. 
 
4.Results 
 
4.1Sample 
 
Our literature search identified a total of 47 journal articles that contained empirical evidence on 
the relationship between family involvement and firm performance in publicly traded family 
firms. Of those, 33 studies contained data that could be expressed as a quantitative index of 
association (i.e. correlation), while 14 studies could only be used in the vote count analysis. 
 
More important in a meta-analysis is the number of samples for which the data are available and 
the number of data points available for analysis. Some publications reported results from 
multiple studies, some relied on multiple samples. Finally, most studies looked at the 
phenomenon from different perspectives and often tested the association between family 
involvement and firm performance by using varying degrees of family involvement in 
corporations and firm performance indicators. As a result, most publications provided more than 
one analyzable data point. In total, 248 data points were available for the present meta-analysis, 
of which 212 were correlation-like data points, i.e. correlations or other association statistics 
convertible to correlation-equivalent, and 38 vote count data points. 
One of the common mistakes in meta-analysis is double counting of studies. This happens when 
multiple correlations are reported for the same sample (e.g. the input or outcome construct was 
measured using multiple indicators). It is very important not to count those as independent 
points. Accordingly, every time when multiple indicators derived based on the same sample were 
available, we took an average of those and used it as a single data point to avoid double counting. 
 
The total number of firms comprising the samples was 125,751, of which 100,223 were the firms 
in the quantitative part of the database, i.e. those that yielded correlation-like coefficients, and 
25,528 in the vote count part. At least a few of the studies used overlapping samples (e.g. 
Fortune 500 firms). While the studies were conducted at different times and some of the firms on 
the list dropped out and new firms were added to the list between the studies, it is likely that 
there still was some overlap and data on some of the firms were used in multiple studies. 
Unfortunately, there was no way to parcel those out. Therefore, we had to assume that those 
were different samples and treated them as independent samples. 
 
4.2Effects of family involvement on firm performance in publicly traded firms 
 
The main purpose of this meta-analysis was to examine the relationship between the extent of 
family involvement and firm performance in publicly traded firms (Table I). We first analyzed 
the data from the entire meta-analytic database and calculated the overall effect size (Table II). 
The overall effect size representing the relationship between family involvement and firm 
performance is 0.06 (p < 0.05). It is and also remains statistically significant across a wide range 
of contexts. However, despite being statistically significant and robust, the effect is relatively 
weak. 
 
4.3Moderator analysis 
 
We further tested if the hypothesized relationship between family involvement and firm 
performance is influenced by the context (i.e. institutional environment and firm size), 
methodological moderators (operationalization of firm performance and family involvement, 
research design, such as differences between family versus non-family firms and heterogeneity 
among family firms, time period and sample size) and conceptual moderators (definition of 
family firms and theoretical background). 
 
The findings revealed that, indeed, there are a number of factors that moderate the relationship 
between family involvement and firm performance or can explain the inconsistencies in earlier 
findings. First, we explored if the results could vary across the different operationalization of 
firm performance. The effects range from a sparse 0.02 for operation performance to a more 
substantive 0.09 for ROA. It appears that involvement of the founding family members in 
business does have a weak but statistically significant and meaningful effect on firm’s ROA (rho 
= 0.09, p< 0.05) and a somewhat weaker but still statistically significant effect on firm’s stock 
performance (rho = 0.05, p < 0.05) and performance expressed as Tobin’s Q (rho = 0.05, p < 
0.05). As noted, however, the effect is zero with respect to firms’ operating performance. 
 
Next, we explored if there are systemic differences in the results depending on the researcher’s 
choice of the family involvement type. Indeed, it appears that the more proximal is the family 
involvement in management and/or board, the stronger is the effect. Specifically, the relationship 
was found to be strongest when family involvement is studied in the presence of the founding 
family members on the firm’s top management team and/or the board of directors (rho = 
0.08, p < 0.05). 
 
Further, we proceeded with the test of the moderating effects of the context and methodological 
characteristics. The data allowed us to explore how the relationship between family involvement 
and firm performance varied across different institutional contexts, i.e. regions. As we expected, 
the effect was found to be the strongest in Asia (rho = 0.12, p < 0.05), where family ties and 
informal dealings play an important role in business. In contrast, it was found to be the weakest 
in North America and Europe, which are characterized by a highly institutionalized and litigious 
environment (rho = 0.05, p < 0.05). 
 
The effect also tends to diminish as the firm size increases. Family involvement was found to 
matter most in the small firms (rho = 0.12, p < 0.05) and least in large firms (rho = 0.05, p < 
0.05). 
 
Next, it appears that the definition of family firms provided in the studies moderate the reported 
results on the relationship between family involvement and firm performance. Studies that rely 
on components and essence approach tended to report the strongest effect (rho = 0.10, p < 0.05), 
while studies that provided no explicit definition or had an empirical focus tended to report the 
weakest effect (rho = 0.05, p < 0.05). 
 
Likewise, the choice of theory was found to have a moderating effect on the findings. Namely, 
studies that relied on organizational theory tended to report much stronger effects (rho = 
0.10, p < 0.05) than studies that relied on agency theory or multiple theories (rho = 0.05, p < 
0.05). The weakest result was reported by the studies that use other theories (rho = 0.03, p < 
0.05). 
 
On the other hand, the choice of the study design was not found to have an effect on the findings. 
The results were approximately the same regardless of whether the study was based on the 
comparison of the family firms versus non-family firms or the heterogeneity by the degree of 
family involvement was investigated (rho = 0.07 and 0.05, respectively, p < 0.05). 
 
Intriguingly, time period investigated was found to have as strong moderating effect on the 
results. Overall, the sample size weighted correlation between the year of the study and the 
reported effect of family involvement on firm performance was a rather high (r = −0.30 [p < 
0.05]). That is, the reported effect was found to diminish over time. To better understand the 
tendency, we conducted a comparative analysis of the meta-analytic estimates for the three 
different decades for which data were available. The effect size diminished from 0.14 in the 
1980s to 0.06 in the 1990s and 0.05 in the 2000s. 
 
Finally, we tested the moderating effect of the sample size. The correlation coefficient tends to 
be strongly influenced by the sample size. This is why statistical significance must be taken into 
account when interpreting a correlation coefficient. Small samples can produce large correlation 
coefficients, which may, however, be statistically insignificant. The opposite is true for large 
samples, which tend to produce smaller but statistically significant coefficients. This is certainly 
the case in our meta-analytic database. The correlations between sample size and the reported 
effect size is r = −0.10 (p < 0.05). In terms of different sample sizes, studies that used samples of 
500 or fewer firms reported, on average, effects of rho = 0.14 (p < 0.05), which further 
diminished to rho = 0.06 and 0.05 for samples of 500-1,000 firms and over 1,000 firms, 
respectively. 
 
4.4Vote count 
 
The results of the vote count analyses were generally consistent with the traditional meta-
analytic tests. In line with the overall effect of family involvement on firm performance obtained 
by the meta-analytic integration, the vote count generally showed that somewhat, more studies 
report a statistically significant effect than studies that report a statistically negative effect. This 
was especially true for the categories where the meta-analytic effect was strongest. For example, 
when firm performance is operationalized in terms ROA, the meta-analytic effect size is the 
largest (rho = 0.09, p < 0.05). Landing further support to this finding, six additional studies 
reported a statistically positive relationship, while only three studies reported a statistically 
negative effect. However, the opposite was true for some other categories. For example, the 
meta-analytic results suggest that when founding family member involvement in everyday 
management and board of directors, the effect of family involvement is the strongest, compared 
to when it is exercised in another form. Only three vote count studies confirmed this finding, 
while five reported a statistically significant result. 
 
The more important conclusion here is that while overall family involvement in publicly traded 
firms may have a positive effect on firm performance, it is not very strong. Under some 
circumstances, the effect may even be negative. All in all, family involvement in publicly traded 
family firms certainly does not explain much variation in firm performance, although it plays 
some role. 
 
In conclusion of this section, we should note, however, that the Q statistics was rather high and 
statistically significant for most of the reported meta-analytic effects, as well as the credibility 
intervals almost always included zero. This means that the reported effects are not uniform 
across all populations, and more moderators may be present. Unfortunately, our data did not 
allow for a more fine-grained moderator analysis. It appears it would be a promising future 
research venue. 
 
4.5Robustness checks 
 
First, although the effect of family involvement on firm performance is rather weak, i.e. typically 
in the neighborhood of rho = 0.05-0.08, it is statistically significant, irrespective of the sample, 
environment or study characteristics. 
 
Second, the reported effects do not vary much across studies. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution 
of the reported effects. While we found a few studies that reported correlations that could be 
characterized as moderately strong, 90 per cent of the studies reported correlations in the range 
from −0.05 to 0.30 and over 70 per cent of the reported effects fell within the 0.05-0.20 range. 
That is, spare a few outliers, virtually all studies on the topic found that family involvement has a 
positive but weak effect on family performance. 
 
Third, the fail-safe N was rather high for most of the meta-analytic effects, typically being close 
to k (number of studies used in the analysis). That is, even if we missed some studies, it would 
generally take as many zero-effect studies as we already found to negate the reported positive 
effect of family involvement. Thus, in case of having missed some studies, it is a small 
likelihood that all the studies we missed found a zero effect of family involvement on firm 
performance. Therefore, the effect may be weak, but there is strong evidence that it is persistent 
and greater than zero. 
 
5. Discussion 
 
Family involvement in corporations around the world is prevalent. However, we still do not 
know enough about the organizational outcomes of such involvement. To have a better 
understanding of the corporate governance dynamics in publicly traded family firms, we 
conducted a meta-analysis of published studies specifically examining the link between family 
involvement and firm performance. 
 
Our findings contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we show that the effects of family 
involvement on firm performance are positive but weak among publicly traded firms. Family 
involvement is certainly no panacea, and it explains only a small portion of variation in firm 
performance. However, although the effect is weak, it is consistent and persistently positive. This 
finding is statistically significant in almost all contexts, and the findings are highly consistent 
across studies involving samples from around the world. 
 
Second, our findings help us to better understand the variant results of studies investigating the 
link between family involvement and firm performance with a focus on publicly traded firms. 
Indeed, the meta-analysis allowed us to test contingencies, such as the nature of the studies and 
environmental characteristics, which seem to play an important role. Both types of contingencies 
were found to have a moderating effect on the relationship between family involvement and firm 
performance in publicly traded firms. More specifically, we found that operationalization of firm 
performance, type of family involvement, institutional context by region, firm size, definition of 
family firm, theoretical background, research design in terms of comparison between family and 
non-family firms and heterogeneity among family firms, time periods studied and sample size 
were contingencies that influence the link between family involvement and firm performance. 
 
Third, our findings shed light on why the results varied remarkably across different studies. 
Evidently, context, methodological factors and conceptual factors tend to affect the results of the 
studies. Therefore, scholars and practitioners may need to act carefully while interpreting 
findings and reaching conclusions by considering the moderators investigated in this meta-
analysis and other possible contingencies beyond the scope of our study that may exist. 
 
6.Limitations and future research directions 
 
Like any meta-analysis, our study is not without limitations. Most of the limitations were pre-
determined by the limitations of the studies in our meta-analytic sample. For example, we could 
only meta-analyze the studies that are available in the public domain. Thus, the file-drawer bias 
could be a threat to validity of our findings. That is, it has been suggested that studies that find 
no effect or have other undesirable characteristics may be less likely to be published (and stay in 
the file drawer). If this is the case, our sample may be systemically biased against the no-effect 
studies, which could affect our findings. 
 
It must be noted that some of our estimates were based on a relatively small sample of studies. 
This is especially true of our moderator analysis where some of the estimates were calculated 
based on only few data points. Clearly, reliability of these findings is suspected, and thus, the 
findings should be interpreted with caution. 
 
At the same time, these limitations provide directions for future research. The main goal of a 
meta-analysis is not only to provide a synthesis of earlier research but also to detect limitations 
of earlier studies. Our meta-analytic review shows that, indeed, a number of promising areas 
have been under-researched. For example, only few studies on the relationship between family 
involvement and firm performance were conducted outside the USA, and this is where family 
involvement appears to matter most. Hence, studies involving samples around the world and 
cross-country studies will increase the generalizability of findings. 
 
Furthermore, the greatest promise was detected in the most under-researched areas. For example, 
we could find only three studies that focused on the effects of family involvement on firm 
performance in relatively smaller publicly traded firms, one studying small firms and two 
studying medium-sized publicly traded firms. Incidentally, this is where we detected the largest 
effect size. Because of low reliability of this finding and the small sample size, the reported 
effect may be far from the actual effect size. However, the current evidence suggests that this 
under-researched area is a promising venue for future research. 
 
In addition, among the articles we have examined, the theoretical focus has been mostly 
on agency theory. However, although we had only one study drawing upon organizational 
theory, we observed the strongest effect size here. More research on the link between family 
involvement and firm performance through this theoretical lens may further enrich and advance 
theory of the family firm. 
 
Perhaps most importantly, definition of family business is fundamental as it constitutes the 
foundation for theory and research design. Consistent with this, studies using the definition of 
family firms based on components and essence approaches tend to exhibit the strongest effect 
size while investigating the link between family involvement and firm performance, whereas 
studies lacking of a definition of family business appear to be the ones with lowest effect size 
and non-significant results. Therefore, we recommend future studies to start with a definition of 
family firms based on components and essence approaches to set the stage for theoretical and 
methodological advancement efforts in the field. 
 
7.Public policy implications 
 
Enhancement of economic growth through maximizing shareholder wealth and providing 
employment in corporations are among the top priorities of many governments around the globe. 
The findings of the present study have important implications for public policy development. 
The macroeconomic policies geared toward regulating and supporting corporate enterprises for 
financial success within legal and ethical boundaries appear to be based on the assumption that 
firms of comparable size are homogeneous. Consequently, public policy programs usually 
categorize firms according to size (i.e. number of employees and sales turnover) and/or industry. 
Indeed, existing programs, rules and regulations place publicly traded family and non-family 
firms together into a “corporate sector”. This study suggests that publicly traded family firms are 
distinct from non-family firms in economically significant ways, owing to the controlling 
families’ influence on the firms even with relatively small percentage of involvement in 
corporate governance through ownership, management and board membership. 
 
Our meta-analytic evidence on the impact of the family involvement on firm performance is a 
step forward by alerting policy-makers of the need for public policy to take into account the 
unique characteristics of this prevalent form of business enterprise. For example, publicly traded 
family firms pursue a variety of economic and family-centered non-economic goals that 
sometimes conflict with minority shareholders’ expectations (Anderson and Reeb, 
2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2004; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2001; Morck and Yeung, 2003). The better 
these goals are understood and articulated, the better policy-makers will be able to provide 
programs and regulations to limit the negative influence of families and enhance the positive 
impact for corporate family enterprise growth and success. If the policy-makers fail to recognize 
the importance of publicly traded family firms and their idiosyncrasies, not only the corporate 
units themselves but also the broader economies and societies could be adversely affected owing 
to their large scale and scope, which can be even at a global extent. 
 
8.Conclusion 
 
In our paper, family involvement in publicly traded family firms is reviewed by using meta-
analytical techniques. We identified several factors which significantly drive the differences in 
results of previous research on the relationship between family involvement and firm 
performance. Thus, not only the operationalization of firm performance and the type of family 
involvement but also various moderator variables influence the relationship. Although the overall 
size effect is relatively weak, it is significant and increases when methodological and conceptual 
moderators are integrated in the meta-analytical framework. Through our study, we identified 
differences in the results of previous studies and potential explanations for its antecedents. By 
considering several influence factors, we seek to summarize past research, reconcile mixed 
findings and identify under-researched areas to get closer to a comprehensive understanding of 
the relationship between family involvement and firm performance in publicly traded firms. 
Thus, our findings can help not only future researchers to further develop family business theory 
in various ways but also family business members, investors and consultants to better understand 
the role of family involvement in corporations. 
 
 
Figure 1. Robustness check: effect size distribution 
 
Table I. Definitions of predictor and outcome variables  
Variables Definition 
Predictor variables 
Family 
ownership 
A continuous variable including the following categories: 
a) ownership of the largest shareholder in family firm; 
b) the percentage of equity owned by family members and its square term; 
c) ratio of the number of shares of all classes held by the family to total shares 
outstanding 
Family 
involvement 
in 
management 
and/or board 
Either a dummy or continuous variable. A dummy variable indicates whether the 
family has a member working as either management such as CEO or director; a 
continuous variable represents the total number of family members in the TMT 
and/or board of directors as well as its square term 
Family firm 
dummy 
A dummy variable which indicates whether the firm is defined as family firm 
Family 
generational 
impact 
Either a dummy or continuous variable. A dummy variable indicates whether the 
family has the founder or first-generation member working as either management 
such as CEO or director and thus controls the firm; a continuous variable represents 
the total block ownership by founder (or descendants) and families and closely 
affiliated individuals 
Governance 
mechanism 
A dummy variable or a continuous variable which includes various measures related 
to corporate governance mechanisms such as board independence, board ownership 
and institutional ownership 
Other 
predictors 
Other measures not included in the first four categories 
Outcome variables 
Market 
valuation 
Includes measures of firm market value such as Tobin’s Q, EPS, P/E ratio and 
market/book ratio 
Accounting 
performance 
Includes measures of accounting performance such as ROA, ROE and OROA 
Operational 
performance 
Represents measures of firm operational performance such as sales growth, income 
growth, R&D/sales and capex/sales 
Other 
outcome 
Other measures not included in the first three categories 
 
 
 
Table II. The direct relationship between family involvement and firm performance 
Performa
nce 
measures 
and 
moderator
s 
N k ESuc ESc SD
ES 
CIl CIu CrIl Cr
Iu 
Q NF
S 
k N + N
S 
− 
Overall 100,2
23 
3
3 
0.05
* 
0.06
* 
0.0
4 
0.04 0.07 −0.
03 
0.1
4 
160
* 
25 1
4 
25,5
28 
7 1 6 
By performance scale 
Accountin
g 
performanc
e 
16,15
4 
2
8 
0.06
* 
0.07
* 
0.0
7 
0.05 0.09 −0.
05 
0.1
9 
75* 18 
     
Firm 
market 
valuation 
16,40
7 
2
7 
0.04
* 
0.05
* 
0.1
0 
0.01 0.09 −0.
13 
0.2
2 
134
* 
20 2 849 
  
2 
Operation 
performanc
e 
8,060 1
2 
−0.0
7* 
−0.0
8* 
0.1
0 
−0.
14 
−0.
02 
−0.
27 
0.1
2 
79* 16 
     
Other 3409 4 0.05
* 
0.06
* 
0.0
4 
0.03 0.09 0.06 0.0
6 
3 3 1 300 
  
1 
By type of family involvement 
Family 
firm 
identity 
9,169 1
5 
0.07
* 
0.08
* 
0.1
1 
0.02 0.14 −0.
13 
0.2
9 
99* 9 5 7,92
1 
4 
 
1 
Family 
generation
al impact 
3,637 4 0.06
* 
0.07
* 
0.0
5 
0.02 0.12 0.00 0.1
3 
7 3 3 6,15
4 
1 
 
2 
Involveme
nt in 
manageme
nt and 
board 
13,93
4 
2
0 
0.07
* 
0.08
* 
0.1
3 
0.02 0.14 −0.
16 
0.3
3 
207
* 
13 8 14,5
78 
3 
 
5 
Family 
ownership 
15,44
1 
2
6 
0.00 0.00 0.1
0 
−0.
04 
0.04 −0.
18 
0.1
8 
131
* 
25 
     
Governanc
e 
mechanism 
11,32
8 
1
1 
0.04
* 
0.04
* 
0.0
6 
0.00 0.08 −0.
06 
0.1
5 
37* 9 7 2,17
0 
4 
 
3 
Other 5,278 4 0.16
* 
0.17
* 
0.0
8 
0.09 0.25 0.03 0.3
2 
29* 1 1 300 
 
1 
 
By region 
Asia 5,843 1
3 
0.04
* 
0.05
* 
0.0
6 
0.01 0.08 −0.
02 
0.1
1 
19 10 1 1,29
6 
1 
  
Latin 
America 
506 2 0.07
* 
0.08
* 
0.0
1 
0.07 0.08 0.08 0.0
8 
1 1 
     
Europe 8,351 8 0.06
* 
0.07
* 
0.0
4 
0.04 0.10 0.01 0.1
3 
14 6 6 12,9
76 
3 
 
3 
North 
America 
19,22
7 
2
6 
0.02 0.02
* 
0.1
1 
−0.
02 
0.06 −0.
19 
0.2
3 
207
* 
24 1
1 
11,5
82 
5 
 
6 
By size 
Small 341 1 0.12
* 
             
Medium 5,339 3 0.06
* 
0.07
* 
0.0
2 
0.05 0.09 0.07 0.0
7 
1 2 
     
Large 27,19
9 
4
5 
0.02 0.02 0.1
0 
−0.
01 
0.05 −0.
16 
0.2
1 
247
* 
40 1
0 
14,2
41 
5 
 
5 
By definition 
Componen
ts and 
essence 
12 1 0.09
* 
0.10
* 
            
Empirical 
focus 
81,49
7 
1
2 
0.04
* 
0.05
* 
0.0
4 
0.03 0.07 −0.
03 
0.1
2 
114
* 
9 2 4,48
8 
  
2 
No explicit 
definition 
3,125 4 0.04
* 
0.05
* 
0.0
5 
0.02 0.07 0.05 0.0
5 
1 3 4 16,8
52 
1 
 
3 
Other 6,068 8 0.08
* 
0.09
* 
0.0
8 
0.03 0.14 −0.
05 
0.2
2 
32* 5 4 2,92
3 
2 
 
2 
Self-
developed 
definition 
6,158 9 0.06
* 
0.07
* 
0.0
7 
0.02 0.12 −0.
04 
0.1
9 
27* 6 4 4,02
1 
1 
 
3 
By theory 
Agency 
theory 
88,75
0 
2
5 
0.05
* 
0.05
* 
0.0
5 
0.03 0.07 −0.
03 
0.1
4 
172
* 
19 6 7,34
3 
2 
 
4 
Organizati
onal theory 
473 1 0.10
* 
             
Other 
theory 
3,355 2 0.03
* 
0.03
* 
0.0
1 
0.02 0.04 0.03 0.0
3 
0 1 2 3,44
0 
1 
 
1 
Multiple 
theories 
7,645 5 0.04
* 
0.05
* 
0.0
3 
0.02 0.08 0.01 0.0
9 
8 4 6 19,8
56 
3 
 
3 
By study design 
FB vs non-
FB 
258,3
37 
2
4 
0.06
* 
0.07
* 
0.0
8 
0.03 0.10 −0.
08 
0.2
2 
167
* 
16 1
0 
11,5
68 
5 
 
5 
Heterogene
ity analysis 
of FB 
71,88
6 
9 0.04
* 
0.05
* 
0.0
1 
0.04 0.05 0.05 0.0
5 
7 7 3 9,41
9 
1 
 
2 
By year 
Year-effect 
size 
correlation 
100,2
23 
3
3 
−0.3
0* 
             
1980s 438 2 0.13
* 
0.14
* 
0.1
3 
0.01 0.25 −0.
10 
0.1
4 
8* 1 1 236 
  
1 
1990s 84,81
0 
1
9 
0.05
* 
0.06
* 
0.0
4 
0.03 0.06 0.01 0.1
1 
18* 10 7 12,4
59 
3 
 
4 
2000s 14,71
2 
1
1 
0.04
* 
0.05
* 
0.0
3 
0.03 0.07 0.02 0.0
8 
13* 9 5 8,46
8 
2 
 
3 
Sample size 
Sample 
size-effect 
size 
correlation 
100,2
23 
3
3 
−0.1
0* 
             
Less than 
500 
4,252 1
4 
0.13
* 
0.14
* 
0.1
2 
0.08 0.20 −0.
06 
0.3
4 
53* 5 
     
500-1,000 5,777 8 0.05
* 
0.06
* 
0.0
5 
0.02 0.09 0.00 0.1
1 
11 6 
     
More than 
1,000 
90,19
4 
1
0 
0.04
* 
0.05
* 
0.0
3 
0.03 0.07 −0.
01 
0.1
0 
66* 8 
     
Note: 
*p < 0.05 
 
Notes 
• 1.  According to Morck and Steier 2005), a pyramid is a structure prevalent around the 
world except in the US and U.K. in which a shareholder, usually a family, controls a 
single company and this company then holds control blocks in other companies and each 
of these companies holds control blocks in even more companies, which is rare in the US. 
• 2.  Regardless of the actual variable labels, our operationalization of the predictor 
variables is explained in Table 1, which also includes definitions of the outcome 
variables. 
 
References 
 
1. Adams, R., Almedia, H. and Ferreira, D. (2009), “Understanding the relationship 
between founder-CEOs and firm performance”, Journal of Empirical Finance, Vol. 16 
No. 1, pp. 136-150.   
 
2. Aguinis, H., Dalton, D.R., Bosco, F.A., Pierce, C.A. and Dalton, C.M. (2011), “Meta-
analytic choices and judgment calls: implications for theory building and testing, 
obtained effect sizes, and scholarly impact”, Journal of Management, Vol. 37 No. 1, 
pp. 5-38.   
 
3. Ali, A., Chen, T.Y. and Radhakrishnan, S. (2007), “Corporate disclosures by family 
firms”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 44 Nos 1/2, pp. 238-286.   
 
4. Anderson, R.C. and Reeb, D.M. (2003a), “Founding-family ownership and firm 
performance: evidence from the S&P 500”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 58 No. 3, 
pp. 1301-1328.   
 
5. Anderson, R.C. and Reeb, D.M. (2003b), “Founding-family ownership, corporate 
diversification and firm leverage”, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 46 No. 2, 
pp. 653-684.   
 
6. Anderson, R.C. and Reeb, D.M. (2003c) “Who monitors the family?”, Working 
Paper, American University, Washington, DC. 
 
7. Anderson, R.C. and Reeb, D.M. (2004), “Board composition: balancing family influence 
in S&P 500 firms”, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 49 No. 2, pp. 209-237.   
 
8. Anderson, R.C., Duru, A. and Reeb, D.M. (2009), “Founders, heirs, and corporate 
opacity”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 92, pp. 205-222.   
 
9. Andres, C. (2008), “Large shareholders and firm performance: an empirical examination 
of founding-family ownership”, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 14 No. 4, pp. 431-
445.   
 
10. Ang, J.S., Cole, R.A. and Lin, J.W. (2000), “Agency costs and ownership structure”, The 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 55 No. 1, pp. 81-106.   
 
11. Arthur, W., Bennett, W. and Huffcutt, A. (2011), Conducting Meta-Analysis Using 
SAS, Taylor & Francis e-Library.  
 
12. Astrachan, J.H., Zahra, S.A. and Sharma, P. (2003), Family-Sponsored 
Ventures, Kauffman Foundation, Wichita, KS.  
 
13. Barontini, R. and Caprio, L. (2006), “The effect of family control on firm value and 
performance: evidence from continental Europe”, European Financial Management, Vol. 
12 No. 5, pp. 689-723.  
 
14. Berrone, P., Cruz, C., Gomez-Mejia, L.R. and Larraza-Kintana, M. (2010), 
“Socioemotional wealth and corporate responses to institutional pressures: do family-
controlled firms pollute less?”, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 55 No. 1, pp. 82-
113. 
 
15. Bertrand, M. and Schoar, A. (2006), “The role of family in family firms”, The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 20 No. 2, pp. 73-96. 
 
16. Bushman, B.J. (1994), “Vote-Counting Procedures in Meta-Analysis”, in Cooper, 
H.M. and Hedges, L.V. (Eds), The Handbook of Research Synthesis, Russell Sage 
Foundation, New York, NY, pp. 193-213. 
 
17. Carney, M. (2005), “Corporate governance and competitive advantage in family-
controlled firms”, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 29 No. 3, pp. 249-266. 
 
18. Carton, R.B. and Hofer, C.W. (2006), Measuring Organizational Performance: Metrics 
for Entrepreneurship and Strategic Management Research, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, Northampton, MA. 
 
19. Chrisman, J.J., Chua, J.H. and Sharma, P. (2005), “Trends and directions in the 
development of a strategic management theory of the family firm”, Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice, Vol. 29 No. 5, pp. 555-576. 
 
20. Chrisman, J.J., Memili, E. and Misra, K. (2014), “Nonfamily managers, family firms, and 
the winner’s curse: the influence of noneconomic goals and bounded rationality”, 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 38 No. 5, pp. 1103-1127. 
 
21. Chrisman, J.J., Chua, J.H., Pearson, A.W. and Barnett, T. (2012), “Family involvement, 
family influence, and family‐centered non‐economic goals in small firms”, 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 36 No. 2, pp. 267-293. 
 
22. Chua, J.H., Chrisman, J.J. and Sharma, P. (1999), “Defining the family business by 
behavior”, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 23 No. 4, pp. 19-39. 
 
23. Chung, K.H. and Pruitt, S.W. (1994), “A simple approximation of tobin’s Q”, Financial 
Management, Vol. 23 No. 3, pp. 70-74. 
 
24. Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J.P.H. and Lang, L.H.P. (2002), “Disentangling the 
incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 
57 No. 6, pp. 2741-2771. 
 
25. Coates, J.C. (2007), “The goals and promise of the sarbanes-oxley act”, The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 21 No. 1, pp. 91-116. 
 
26. Cooper, H. (2014),Research Synthesis and Meta-Analysis: A Step-by-Step 
Approach, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA. 
 
27. Cooper, H.M. and Hedges, L.V. (1994), The Handbook of Research Synthesis, Russell 
Sage Foundation, New York, NY.   
 
28. Crook, T.R., Combs, J.G., Ketchen, D.J. and Aguinis, H. (2013), “Organizing around 
transaction costs: what have we learned and where do we go from here”, Academy of 
Management Perspectives, Vol. 27 No. 1, pp. 63-79.   
 
29. Daily, C.M., Dalton, D.R. and Cannella, A.A. (2003), “Corporate governance: decades of 
dialogue and data”, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 28 No. 3, pp. 371-382.   
 
30. De Massis, A., Sharma, P., Chua, J.H. and Chrisman, J.J. (2012), Family Business 
Studies: Anannotated Bibliography, Edward Elgar Publishing. 
 
31. Dyer, W.G. and Whetten, D.A. (2006), “Family firms and social responsibility: 
preliminary evidence from the S&P 500”, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 30 
No. 6, pp. 785-802. 
 
32. Filatotchev, I., Lien, Y.-C. and Piesse, J. (2005), “Corporate governance and performance 
in publicly listed, family-controlled firms: evidence from Taiwan”, Asia Pacific Journal 
of Management, Vol. 22, pp. 257-283. 
 
33. Gedajlovic, E., Carney, M., Chrisman, J.J. and Kellermanns, F.W. (2012), “The 
adolescence of family firm research taking stock and planning for the future”, Journal of 
Management, Vol. 38 No. 4, pp. 1010-1037.   
 
34. Gedajlovic, E.R. and Shapiro, D.M. (1998), “Management and ownership effects: 
evidence from five countries”, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 19 No. 6, pp. 533-
553.   
 
35. Gersick, K.E., Davis, J.A., Hampton, M.M. and Lansberg, I. (1997), Generation to 
Generation: Life Cycles of the Family Business, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, 
MA.   
 
36. Gilson, R.J. and Gordon, J.N. (2003), “Doctrines and markets: controlling shareholders”, 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 152 No. 2, pp. 785-844.   
 
37. Gómez-Mejía, L.R., Núñez-Nickel, M. and Gutierrez, I. (2001), “The role of family ties 
in agency contracts”, Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 44 No. 1, pp. 81-95.   
 
38. Gompers, P., Ishii, J. and Metrick, A. (2003), “Corporate governance and equity prices”, 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 118 No. 6, pp. 107-156.   
 
39. Habbershon, T.G. and Williams, M. (1999), “A resource-based framework for assessing 
the strategic advantage of family firms”, Family Business Review, Vol. 12 No. 1, pp. 1-
25.   
 
40. Harms, H. (2014), “Review of family business definitions: cluster approach and 
implications of heterogeneous application for family business research”, International 
Journal of Financial Studies, Vol. 2 No. 3, pp. 280-314.   
 
41. Heugens, P.P., van Essen, M. and van Oosterhout, J.H. (2009), “Meta-analyzing 
ownership concentration and firm performance in Asia: towards a more fine grained 
understanding”, Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Vol. 26 No. 3, pp. 481-512.   
 
42. Hoy, F. and Verser, T.G. (1994), “Emerging business, emerging field: entrepreneurship 
and the family firm”, Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 19 No. 1, pp. 9-23.   
 
43. Hunter, J.E. and Schmidt, F.L. (2004), Methods of Meta-Analysis: Correcting Error and 
Bias in Research Findings, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA.   
 
44. James, H.S. (1999), “Owner as manager, extended horizons, and the family firm”, 
International Journal of the Economics of Business, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 41-55.   
 
45. Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H. (1976), “Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, 
agency costs, and economic organization”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3 No. 4, 
pp. 305-360.   
 
46. King, D.R., Dalton, D.R., Daily, C.M. and Covin, J.G. (2004), “Meta-analyses of post-
acquisition performance: indications of unidentified moderators”, Strategic Management 
Journal, Vol. 25 No. 2, pp. 187-200.   
 
47. La Porta, R., Lopez de Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. (1999), “Corporate ownership around 
the world”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 54 No. 2, pp. 471-517.   
 
48. Le Breton-Miller, I. and Miller, D. (2008), “To grow or to harvest? Governance, strategy 
and performance in family and lone founder firms”, Journal of Strategy and Management, 
Vol. 1 No. 1, pp. 41-56.   
 
49. Le Breton-Miller, I., Miller, D. and Lester, R.H. (2011), “Stewardship or agency? A 
social embeddedness reconciliation of conduct and performance in public family 
businesses”, Organization Science, Vol. 22 No. 3, pp. 704-721.   
 
50. Lee, J. (2004), “The effects of family ownership and management on firm performance”, 
SAM Advanced Management Journal, Vol. 69 No. 4, pp. 46-53.   
 
51. Lee, J. (2006), “Family firm performance: further evidence”, Family Business Review, 
Vol. 19 No. 2, pp. 103-114.   
 
52. Lipsey, M.W. and Wilson, D.B. (2000), Practical Meta-Analysis, Sage 
Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA.   
 
53. Liu, W., Yang, H. and Zhang, G. (2012), “Does family business excel in firm 
performance? An institution-based view”, Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Vol. 29 
No. 4, pp. 965-987.   
 
54. McConaughy, D.L. and Phillips, G.M. (1999), “Founders versus descendants: the 
profitability, efficiency, growth characteristics and financing in large, public, founding-
family-controlled firms”, Family Business Review, Vol. 12 No. 2, pp. 123-131.   
 
55. McConaughy, D.L., Walker, M.C., Henderson, G.V. and Mishra, C.S. (1998), “Founding 
family controlled firms: efficiency and value”, Review of Financial Economics, Vol. 7 
No. 1, pp. 1-19.   
 
56. McGuire, J., Dow, S. and Ibrahim, B. (2012), “All in the family? Social performance and 
corporate governance in the family firm”, Journal of Business Research, Vol. 65 No. 11, 
pp. 1643-1650.   
 
57. Melin, L. and Nordqvist, M. (2007), “The reflexive dynamics of institutionalization: the 
case of the family business”, Strategic Organization, Vol. 5 No. 3, pp. 321-333.   
 
58. Memili, E. (2011) “Control enhancing corporate governance mechanisms: family vs Non-
family publicly-traded firms”, Dissertation, Mississippi State University, Mississippi, 
MS.   
 
59. Memili, E., Misra, K. and Chrisman, J.J. (2012), “Family involvement and the use of 
corporate governance provisions protecting controlling versus noncontrolling owners”, 
Journal of Leadership, Accountability and Ethics, Vol. 9 No. 3, pp. 11-27.   
 
60. Merkin, R., Taras, V. and Steel, P. (2014), “State of the art themes in cross-cultural 
communication research: a systematic and Meta analytic review”, International Journal of 
Intercultural Relations, Vol. 38, pp. 1-23.   
 
61. Miller, D. and Le Breton-Miller, I. (2005a), “Management insights from great and 
struggling family businesses”, Long Range Planning, Vol. 38 No. 6, pp. 517-530.   
 
62. Miller, D. and Le Breton-Miller, I. (2005b), Managing for the Long Run: Lessons in 
Competitive Advantage from Great Family Businesses, Harvard Business School 
Press, Boston, MA.   
 
63. Miller, D. and Le Breton-Miller, I. (2006), “Family governance and firm performance: 
agency, stewardship, and capabilities”, Family Business Review, Vol. 19 No. 1, pp. 73-
88.   
 
64. Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I. and Lester, R.H. (2013), “Family firm governance, 
strategic conformity, and performance: institutional vs. Strategic perspectives”, 
Organization Science, Vol. 24 No. 1, pp. 189-209.   
 
65. Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I., Lester, R.H. and Cannella, A.A. (2007), “Are family 
firms superior performers?”, Journal of Corporate Finance, Vol. 13 No. 5, pp. 829-858.   
 
66. Morck, R. and Steier, L. (2005) “The global history of corporate governance: an 
introduction”, NBER Working Paper Series, 11062, National Bureau of Economic 
Research, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL.   
 
67. Morck, R. and Yeung, B. (2003), “Agency problems in large family business groups”, 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Vol. 27 No. 4, pp. 367-383.   
 
68. O’Boyle, E.H., Pollack, J.M. and Rutherford, M.W. (2012), “Exploring the relation 
between family involvement and firms’ financial performance: a meta analysis of main 
and moderator effects”, Journal of Business Venturing, Vol. 27 No. 1, pp. 1-18.   
 
69. Orwin, R.G. (1994), “Evaluating coding decisions”, in Cooper, H. and Hedges, 
L.V. (Eds), The Handbook of Research Synthesis, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 
NY, pp. 139-162.   
 
70. Peng, M.W. and Jiang, Y. (2010), “Institutions behind family ownership and control in 
large firms”, Journal of Management Studies, Vol. 47 No. 2, pp. 253-273.   
 
71. Schulze, W.S. and Gedajlovic, E.R. (2010), “Whither family business?”, Journal of 
Management Studies, Vol. 47 No. 2, pp. 191-204.   
 
72. Sharpe, D. (1997), “Of apples and oranges, file drawers and garbage: why validity issues 
in Meta-analysis will not go away”, Clinical Psychology Review, Vol. 17 No. 8, pp. 881-
901.   
 
73. Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1997), “A survey of corporate governance”, Journal of 
Finance, Vol. 52 No. 2, pp. 737-784.   
 
74. Sraer, D. and Thesmar, D. (2007), “Performance and behavior of family firms: evidence 
from the french stock market”, Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 5 
No. 4, pp. 709-751.   
 
75. Stahl, G.K. and Voigt, A. (2008), “Do cultural differences matter in mergers and 
acquisitions? A tentative model and examination”, Organization Science, Vol. 19 No. 1, 
pp. 160-176.   
 
76. Taras, V., Kirkman, B.L. and Steel, P. (2010), “Examining the impact of culture’s 
consequences: a three-decade, multilevel, meta-analytic review of hofstede’s cultural 
value dimensions”, Journal of Applied Psychology, Vol. 95 No. 3, p. 405.   
 
77. Villalonga, B. and Amit, R. 2006a. “Benefits and costs of control-enhancing mechanisms 
in US family firms”, ECGI Finance Working Paper, 131/2006, European Corporate 
Governance Institute.   
 
78. Villalonga, B. and Amit, R. (2006b), “How do family ownership, management, and 
control affect firm value?”, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 80 No. 2, pp. 385-417.   
 
79. Villalonga, B. and Amit, R. (2009a), Family Control of Firms and Industries, Harvard 
Business School Publishing, Boston, MA.   
 
80. Villalonga, B. and Amit, R. (2009b), “How are US family firms controlled?”, The 
Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 22 No. 8, pp. 3047-3091.   
 
81. Zahra, S.A. (2005), “Entrepreneurial risk taking in family firms”, Family Business 
Review, Vol. 18 No. 1, pp. 23-40.   
 
82. Zellweger, T. (2007), “Time horizon, costs of equity capital, and generic investment 
strategies of firms”, Family Business Review, Vol. 20 No. 1, pp. 1-15.   
 
 
